The National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) raises the alarm over mounting evidence that the 2025 elections may have been compromised. At the center of this crisis is the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) use of software version 3.5.0 for vote counting, a version that was not formally certified as required by law.
The only version with public documentation of certification and audit is 3.4.0, signed off by Pro V&V on April 30, 2025. Version 3.5.0, however, was the one actually deployed during the elections.
COMELEC’s explanations have shifted over time. On May 11, it claimed that version 3.5.0 was functionally identical to version 3.4.0, with the only change being a version label updated after the final certification. This implied that the deployed software, though renamed, was still covered by the earlier certification. But by May 12, COMELEC and Pro V&V issued a new explanation: that version 3.5.0 had in fact been subjected to the final trusted build process, and the changes were based on final updates submitted by Miru Systems on March 28. A Final Source Code Review Report was promised, but has yet to be released.
These shifting narratives raise concerns not only about compliance with the Automated Election System Law but also about COMELEC’s obligation to ensure full public transparency.
Meanwhile, across the country, voters reported “overvoting,” mismatched digital receipts, machine malfunctions, and missing names from voter rolls. In Quezon City, for instance, official COMELEC data shows 804 ballots cast in a precinct where only 767 voters were recorded. Gabriela Women’s Party lost 50,000 votes in the course of transmission.
These are not isolated glitches. When viewed alongside the uncertified software version, they form a troubling pattern that undermines the credibility of the elections.
COMELEC must be held accountable not just for technical lapses, but for failing to uphold its legal obligation to ensure transparency and integrity in the electoral process. Its explanations have been contradictory, incomplete, and ultimately unsatisfactory.
We call for a full, precinct-level manual count of votes and an independent audit of COMELEC’s software versions, review protocols, and chain of custody.
When trust in the system breaks down, transparency must take its place. The people have the right to know their votes were counted truthfully. Without credibility, there is no legitimacy.###
